The strength of weak embodiment
Titulo:

The strength of weak embodiment
.

Sumario:

La teoría de la cognición corporeizada se separa de una ontología cartesiana basada en el sistema modular. Las ventajas del enfoque de la corporeización son: a) enraiza la cognición en la experiencia modal, b) está en armonía con una filosofía materialista de la mente (materialismo emergente), y c) está respaldada por la investigación experimental en varios campos. Sin embargo, la corporeización todavía debe dar cuenta de las abstracciones, los malentendidos teóricos (representación vs. no representación) y los hallazgos neurocientíficos que desafían la relevancia de las propiedades sensoriomotoras en los procesos cognitivos. Mientras que la versión fuerte de la corporeización se ve seriamente desafiada por los retos conceptuales y fisiológ... Ver más

Guardado en:

International Journal of Psychological Research

2011-2084

2011-7922

Marmolejo-Ramos, Fernando

Jones, Nathan

Gastelum, Melina

Khatin-Zadeh, Omid

Tirado, Carlos

UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN BUENAVENTURA

10.21500/20112084.3420

11

2018-09-01

77

85

Colombia

sistema modular

Embodiment

materialismo emergente

corporeización

correspondencia intermodal.

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

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International Journal of Psychological Research - 2018

id metarevistapublica_unisanbuenaventura_internationaljournalofpsychologicalresearch_21-article-3420
record_format ojs
spelling The strength of weak embodiment
sistema modular
Artículo de revista
Embodiment
materialismo emergente
corporeización
correspondencia intermodal.
La teoría de la cognición corporeizada se separa de una ontología cartesiana basada en el sistema modular. Las ventajas del enfoque de la corporeización son: a) enraiza la cognición en la experiencia modal, b) está en armonía con una filosofía materialista de la mente (materialismo emergente), y c) está respaldada por la investigación experimental en varios campos. Sin embargo, la corporeización todavía debe dar cuenta de las abstracciones, los malentendidos teóricos (representación vs. no representación) y los hallazgos neurocientíficos que desafían la relevancia de las propiedades sensoriomotoras en los procesos cognitivos. Mientras que la versión fuerte de la corporeización se ve seriamente desafiada por los retos conceptuales y fisiológicos, su versión débil es respaldada por evidencia convincente. Sugerimos que la investigación futura se centre en las bases psicofisiológicas de la cognición corporeizada y redirija los esfuerzos hacia el campo de la correspondencia intermodal.
The strength of weak embodiment
Gentsch, A., Weber, A., Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Schütz-Bosbach, S. (2016). Towards a common framework of grounded action cognition: Relating motor control, perception and cognition. Cognition, 146, 81–89.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195–208.
Lakoff, G. (2014). Mapping the brain’s metaphor circuitry: Metaphorical thought in everyday reason. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 958. doi:doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00958
James, W. (1894). Discussion: The physical basis of emotion. Psychological Review, 1(5), 516.
Hume, D. (1904). An enquiry concerning human understanding (T. K. Paul, Ed.). Open Court Publishing.
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 42(1-3), 335–346.
Gover, M. (1996). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience (book). Mind, Culture, and Activity, 3(4), 295–299.
Goldman, A. (2012). A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(1), 71–88.
Goldinger, S., Papesh, M., Barnhart, A., Hansen, W., & Hout, M. (2016). The poverty of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 959–978.
Glenberg, A. (2015). Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 69(2), 165–171.
Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gibbs, R. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press.
Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1981). How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson’s ecological approach (Vision and Mind. Cambridge ed.; A. Noë, Ed.). MA: MIT Press.
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3-4), 455–479.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119(2), 593–609.
Dennett, D. (1991). The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science. In (pp. 135–148). Eskine, K., Kacinik, N., & Prinz, J. (2011). A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment. Psychological Science, 22(3), 295–299.
Longo, M., Schüür, F., Kammers, M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107 (3), 978–998.
Evans, K. K., & Treisman, A. (2009). Natural crossmodal mappings between visual and auditory features. Journal of Vision, 10(1), 6–6.
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Harvard University Press.
Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 358(1431), 517–528.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Clarendon Press.
Gallace, A., & Spence, C. (2006). Multisensory synesthetic interactions in the speeded classification of visual size. Perception & Psychophysics, 68(7), 1191–1203.
Frith, C., & Dolan, R. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in higher cognitive functions. Cognitive Brain Research, 5(1-2), 175–181.
Freund, P., Friston, K., Thompson, A., Stephan, K., Ashburner, J., Bach, D., … others (2016). Embodied neurology: an integrative framework for neurological disorders. Brain, 139(6), 1855–1861.
Lakoff, G., & Núñez, R. (2000). Where mathematics comes from: How the embodied mind brings mathematics into being. Basic Books.
Margolies, S., & Crawford, L. (2008). Event valence and spatial metaphors of time. Cognition and Emotion, 22(7), 1401–1414.
Mahon, B. (2015). The burden of embodied cognition. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 69(2), 172.
Sigala, N., Gabbiani, F., & Logothetis, N. K. (2002). Visual categorization and object representation in monkeys and humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(2), 187–198.
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Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636.
Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D., Lewis, W., & Garrett, M. (2004). Representing the meanings of object and action words: The featural and unitary semantic space hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 48(4), 422–488.
Varela, F. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330–349.
Spence, C. (2011). Crossmodal correspondences: A tutorial review. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73(4), 971–995.
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why i am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5(2), 1–10.
Shapiro, L. (2014). The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge.
Mahon, B., & Caramazza, A. (2005). The orchestration of the sensory-motor systems: Clues from neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3-4), 480–494.
Salgado-Montejo, A., Marmolejo-Ramos, F., Alvarado, J. A., Arboleda, J. C., Suarez, D. R., & Spence, C. (2016). Drawing sounds: representing tones and chords spatially. Experimental Brain Research, 234(12), 3509–3522.
Price, C., & Friston, K. (2002). Degeneracy and cognitive anatomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(10), 416–421.
Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.
Parise, C., & Spence, C. (2008). Synesthetic congruency modulates the temporal ventriloquism effect. Neuroscience Letters, 442(3), 257–261.
Montoro, P., Contreras, M., Elosúa, M., & Marmolejo-Ramos, F. (2015). Cross-modal metaphorical mapping of spoken emotion words onto vertical space. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1205. doi:103389/fpsyg.2015.01205
Meteyard, L., Cuadrado, S. R., Bahrami, B., & Vigliocco, G. (2012). Coming of age: A review of embodiment and the neuroscience of semantics. Cortex, 48(7), 788–804.
Merritt, D., Casasanto, D., & Brannon, E. M. (2010). Do monkeys think in metaphors? Representations of space and time in monkeys and humans. Cognition, 117 (2), 191–202.
Marmolejo-Ramos, F., Khatin-Zadeh, O., Yazdani-Fazlabadi, B., Tirado, C., & Sagi, E. (2017). Embodied concept mapping: blending structuremapping and embodiment theories. Pragmatics & Cognition, 24(2), 164–185.
Marks, L. E. (2004). Handbook of Multisensory Processes. In C. S. G. A. Calvert & B. E. Stein (Eds.), (pp. 85–105). Cambrigde: MIT Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
Makovac, E., & Gerbino, W. (2010). Sound-shape con gruency affects the multisensory response enhancement. Visual Cognition, 18, 133–137.
Mahon, B., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 102(1-3), 59–70.
Dahl, C., Rasch, M., Tomonaga, M., & Adachi, I. (2013). The face inversion effect in non-human primates revisited-an investigation in chimpanzees (pan troglodytes). Scientific Reports, 3, 2504.
Chemero, A., & Silberstein, M. (2008). After the philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism with science. Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 1–27.
Clark, A. (1998). Embodiment and the philosophy of mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 35–51.
embodiment
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body and mind together again. MIT Press.
Inglés
https://revistas.usb.edu.co/index.php/IJPR/article/view/3420
International Journal of Psychological Research
Universidad San Buenaventura - USB (Colombia)
application/pdf
Journal article
2
11
cross-modal correspondence.
Agur, A. M. R., & Dalley, A. F. (2009). Grant’s atlas of anatomy. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
emergent materialism
embodiment
the modulatory system
Marmolejo-Ramos, Fernando
Jones, Nathan
Gastelum, Melina
Khatin-Zadeh, Omid
Tirado, Carlos
While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind (emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.
International Journal of Psychological Research - 2018
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Alsmith, A. J. T., & De Vignemont, F. (2012). Embodying the mind and representing the body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(1), 1–13.
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Casasanto, D. (2008). Similarity and proximity: When does close in space mean close in mind? Memory & Cognition, 36(6), 1047–1056.
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Publication
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2018-09-01T00:00:00Z
85
77
https://revistas.usb.edu.co/index.php/IJPR/article/download/3420/2929
https://doi.org/10.21500/20112084.3420
10.21500/20112084.3420
2018-09-01
2011-7922
2011-2084
2018-09-01T00:00:00Z
institution UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN BUENAVENTURA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADDESANBUENAVENTURA_COLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection International Journal of Psychological Research
title The strength of weak embodiment
spellingShingle The strength of weak embodiment
Marmolejo-Ramos, Fernando
Jones, Nathan
Gastelum, Melina
Khatin-Zadeh, Omid
Tirado, Carlos
sistema modular
Embodiment
materialismo emergente
corporeización
correspondencia intermodal.
embodiment
cross-modal correspondence.
emergent materialism
embodiment
the modulatory system
title_short The strength of weak embodiment
title_full The strength of weak embodiment
title_fullStr The strength of weak embodiment
title_full_unstemmed The strength of weak embodiment
title_sort strength of weak embodiment
description La teoría de la cognición corporeizada se separa de una ontología cartesiana basada en el sistema modular. Las ventajas del enfoque de la corporeización son: a) enraiza la cognición en la experiencia modal, b) está en armonía con una filosofía materialista de la mente (materialismo emergente), y c) está respaldada por la investigación experimental en varios campos. Sin embargo, la corporeización todavía debe dar cuenta de las abstracciones, los malentendidos teóricos (representación vs. no representación) y los hallazgos neurocientíficos que desafían la relevancia de las propiedades sensoriomotoras en los procesos cognitivos. Mientras que la versión fuerte de la corporeización se ve seriamente desafiada por los retos conceptuales y fisiológicos, su versión débil es respaldada por evidencia convincente. Sugerimos que la investigación futura se centre en las bases psicofisiológicas de la cognición corporeizada y redirija los esfuerzos hacia el campo de la correspondencia intermodal.
description_eng While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind (emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.
author Marmolejo-Ramos, Fernando
Jones, Nathan
Gastelum, Melina
Khatin-Zadeh, Omid
Tirado, Carlos
author_facet Marmolejo-Ramos, Fernando
Jones, Nathan
Gastelum, Melina
Khatin-Zadeh, Omid
Tirado, Carlos
topicspa_str_mv sistema modular
Embodiment
materialismo emergente
corporeización
correspondencia intermodal.
topic sistema modular
Embodiment
materialismo emergente
corporeización
correspondencia intermodal.
embodiment
cross-modal correspondence.
emergent materialism
embodiment
the modulatory system
topic_facet sistema modular
Embodiment
materialismo emergente
corporeización
correspondencia intermodal.
embodiment
cross-modal correspondence.
emergent materialism
embodiment
the modulatory system
citationvolume 11
citationissue 2
publisher Universidad San Buenaventura - USB (Colombia)
ispartofjournal International Journal of Psychological Research
source https://revistas.usb.edu.co/index.php/IJPR/article/view/3420
language Inglés
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
International Journal of Psychological Research - 2018
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
references_eng Gentsch, A., Weber, A., Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Schütz-Bosbach, S. (2016). Towards a common framework of grounded action cognition: Relating motor control, perception and cognition. Cognition, 146, 81–89.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195–208.
Lakoff, G. (2014). Mapping the brain’s metaphor circuitry: Metaphorical thought in everyday reason. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 958. doi:doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00958
James, W. (1894). Discussion: The physical basis of emotion. Psychological Review, 1(5), 516.
Hume, D. (1904). An enquiry concerning human understanding (T. K. Paul, Ed.). Open Court Publishing.
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 42(1-3), 335–346.
Gover, M. (1996). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience (book). Mind, Culture, and Activity, 3(4), 295–299.
Goldman, A. (2012). A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(1), 71–88.
Goldinger, S., Papesh, M., Barnhart, A., Hansen, W., & Hout, M. (2016). The poverty of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(4), 959–978.
Glenberg, A. (2015). Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 69(2), 165–171.
Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gibbs, R. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press.
Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1981). How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson’s ecological approach (Vision and Mind. Cambridge ed.; A. Noë, Ed.). MA: MIT Press.
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3-4), 455–479.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119(2), 593–609.
Dennett, D. (1991). The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science. In (pp. 135–148). Eskine, K., Kacinik, N., & Prinz, J. (2011). A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment. Psychological Science, 22(3), 295–299.
Longo, M., Schüür, F., Kammers, M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107 (3), 978–998.
Evans, K. K., & Treisman, A. (2009). Natural crossmodal mappings between visual and auditory features. Journal of Vision, 10(1), 6–6.
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Harvard University Press.
Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 358(1431), 517–528.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Clarendon Press.
Gallace, A., & Spence, C. (2006). Multisensory synesthetic interactions in the speeded classification of visual size. Perception & Psychophysics, 68(7), 1191–1203.
Frith, C., & Dolan, R. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in higher cognitive functions. Cognitive Brain Research, 5(1-2), 175–181.
Freund, P., Friston, K., Thompson, A., Stephan, K., Ashburner, J., Bach, D., … others (2016). Embodied neurology: an integrative framework for neurological disorders. Brain, 139(6), 1855–1861.
Lakoff, G., & Núñez, R. (2000). Where mathematics comes from: How the embodied mind brings mathematics into being. Basic Books.
Margolies, S., & Crawford, L. (2008). Event valence and spatial metaphors of time. Cognition and Emotion, 22(7), 1401–1414.
Mahon, B. (2015). The burden of embodied cognition. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 69(2), 172.
Sigala, N., Gabbiani, F., & Logothetis, N. K. (2002). Visual categorization and object representation in monkeys and humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(2), 187–198.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636.
Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D., Lewis, W., & Garrett, M. (2004). Representing the meanings of object and action words: The featural and unitary semantic space hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 48(4), 422–488.
Varela, F. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330–349.
Spence, C. (2011). Crossmodal correspondences: A tutorial review. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73(4), 971–995.
Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why i am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5(2), 1–10.
Shapiro, L. (2014). The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge.
Mahon, B., & Caramazza, A. (2005). The orchestration of the sensory-motor systems: Clues from neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3-4), 480–494.
Salgado-Montejo, A., Marmolejo-Ramos, F., Alvarado, J. A., Arboleda, J. C., Suarez, D. R., & Spence, C. (2016). Drawing sounds: representing tones and chords spatially. Experimental Brain Research, 234(12), 3509–3522.
Price, C., & Friston, K. (2002). Degeneracy and cognitive anatomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(10), 416–421.
Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.
Parise, C., & Spence, C. (2008). Synesthetic congruency modulates the temporal ventriloquism effect. Neuroscience Letters, 442(3), 257–261.
Montoro, P., Contreras, M., Elosúa, M., & Marmolejo-Ramos, F. (2015). Cross-modal metaphorical mapping of spoken emotion words onto vertical space. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1205. doi:103389/fpsyg.2015.01205
Meteyard, L., Cuadrado, S. R., Bahrami, B., & Vigliocco, G. (2012). Coming of age: A review of embodiment and the neuroscience of semantics. Cortex, 48(7), 788–804.
Merritt, D., Casasanto, D., & Brannon, E. M. (2010). Do monkeys think in metaphors? Representations of space and time in monkeys and humans. Cognition, 117 (2), 191–202.
Marmolejo-Ramos, F., Khatin-Zadeh, O., Yazdani-Fazlabadi, B., Tirado, C., & Sagi, E. (2017). Embodied concept mapping: blending structuremapping and embodiment theories. Pragmatics & Cognition, 24(2), 164–185.
Marks, L. E. (2004). Handbook of Multisensory Processes. In C. S. G. A. Calvert & B. E. Stein (Eds.), (pp. 85–105). Cambrigde: MIT Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
Makovac, E., & Gerbino, W. (2010). Sound-shape con gruency affects the multisensory response enhancement. Visual Cognition, 18, 133–137.
Mahon, B., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 102(1-3), 59–70.
Dahl, C., Rasch, M., Tomonaga, M., & Adachi, I. (2013). The face inversion effect in non-human primates revisited-an investigation in chimpanzees (pan troglodytes). Scientific Reports, 3, 2504.
Chemero, A., & Silberstein, M. (2008). After the philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism with science. Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 1–27.
Clark, A. (1998). Embodiment and the philosophy of mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 35–51.
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body and mind together again. MIT Press.
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