Titulo:
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
.
Sumario:
En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.
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0122-9893
2346-2051
2023-03-22
15
31
J. J. Moreso - 2023
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Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública Cristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public Reason En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont. In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced. Moreso, J. J. Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, public reason, completeness, the fact of pluralism Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, razón pública, completitud, el hecho del pluralismo 55 Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial Artículo de revista Journal article 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z 2023-03-22 application/pdf text/html text/xml Departamento de Derecho Constitucional Revista Derecho del Estado 0122-9893 2346-2051 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589 10.18601/01229893.n55.03 https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n55.03 spa http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 J. J. Moreso - 2023 Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0. 15 31 Audi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67. Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2). Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006. Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9). Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993. Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997. Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145. Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7. Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981. Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132. Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426. Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989. Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/ Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74. Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583. Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/ Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawls Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997. Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34. Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72. Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939. Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930. Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220. Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185. Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909. Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404. Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772. Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66. Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211. https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13957 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13958 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13981 info:eu-repo/semantics/article http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 Text Publication |
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| title |
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
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Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública Moreso, J. J. Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, public reason, completeness, the fact of pluralism Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, razón pública, completitud, el hecho del pluralismo |
| title_short |
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
| title_full |
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
| title_fullStr |
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
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Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
| title_sort |
cristina lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública |
| title_eng |
Cristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public Reason |
| description |
En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.
|
| description_eng |
In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.
|
| author |
Moreso, J. J. |
| author_facet |
Moreso, J. J. |
| topic |
Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, public reason, completeness, the fact of pluralism Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, razón pública, completitud, el hecho del pluralismo |
| topic_facet |
Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, public reason, completeness, the fact of pluralism Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, razón pública, completitud, el hecho del pluralismo |
| topicspa_str_mv |
Cristina Lafont, John Rawls, razón pública, completitud, el hecho del pluralismo |
| citationissue |
55 |
| citationedition |
Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial |
| publisher |
Departamento de Derecho Constitucional |
| ispartofjournal |
Revista Derecho del Estado |
| source |
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589 |
| language |
spa |
| format |
Article |
| rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 J. J. Moreso - 2023 Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| references |
Audi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67. Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2). Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006. Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9). Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993. Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997. Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145. Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7. Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981. Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132. Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426. Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989. Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/ Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74. Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583. Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/ Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawls Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997. Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34. Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72. Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939. Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930. Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220. Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185. Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909. Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404. Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772. Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66. Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211. |
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