Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
Titulo:

Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
.

Sumario:

Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de lo... Ver más

Guardado en:

Revista de Economía Institucional

0124-5996

2346-2450

Acosta, Benedicto

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/01245996.v27n52.12

27

2024-12-04

341

356

Colombia

valores epistêmicos,

incentivos

bancos de dados,

contrato social,

inovação,

incentivos

bases de datos,

contrato social,

innovación,

valores epistémicos,

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

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Benedicto Acosta - 2024

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spelling Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
Langinier, C., & Marcoul, P. (2020). “Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners”. Journal of Economics and Business 110: 105906.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). “An Economic Theory of Technological Change”. The American Economic Review 59 (2): 18–28.
Nelson, R. R. (1989). “What Is Private and What Is Public About Technology?” Science, Technology, & Human Values 14 (3): 229–241.
Nagar, V., Schoenfeld, J., & Wellman, L. (2019). “The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67 (1): 36–57.
McMullin, E. (1982). “Values in Science”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2): 3–28.
Lemley, M. A., & Sampat, B. (2012). “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3): 817–827.
Larroyed, A. A. (2019). Translation accuracy and dissemination of disclosure of patent information: an analysis of translation and its influence on patent law. Proefschrift Maken Maastricht.
Larroyed, A. A. (2018). “Machine Translation and Disclosure of Patent Information”. IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 49 (7): 763–786.
Kuhn, J. M. (2011). “Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem”. Yale Journal of Law and Technology 90: 89–140.
OEPM. (2013). Memoria de Actividades. Available at http://www.oepm.gob.es/export/sites/oepm/comun/documentos_relacionados/Memorias_de_Actividades_y_Estadisticas/Memorias_de_actividades/Memoria_de_Actividades_2013_ES.pdf
Huby, R., & Schenk, V. T. (1994). “Some problems in the translation of Japanese patents”. World Patent Information 16 (3): 154–158.
Hegde, D., & Raj, M. (2019). “Does Gender Affect Work? Evidence from U.S. Patent Examination”. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339555
Griliches, Z. (1990). “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal of Economic Literature 28(4): 1661–1707.
Gallini, N., & Scotchmer, S. (2002). “Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 2: 51–77.
European Patent Office. (2012). Patent teaching kit – Protect your ideas. Munich. Retrieved from https://e-courses.epo.org/pluginfile.php/1428/mod_resource/content/1/data/cm1.pdf
Eisenberg, R. (1989). “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use”. University of Chicago Law Review 56 (3): 1017–1086.
Eckert, A., & Langinier, C. (2014). “A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Procedures”. Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (5): 996–1015.
Drahos, P. (2010). The Global Governance of Knowledge. Patent Offices and their Clients. Cambridge University Press.
OECD. (2005). Oslo Manual. OECD-EUROSTAT.
OEPM. (2018). “Entrevista a José Antonio Gil Celedonio, nuevo Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 62: 4–12.
Chang, H. F. (1995). “Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation”. RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1): 34–57.
Ying, C., Shuyu, Y., Jing, L., Lin, D., & Qi, Q. (2021). “Errors of Machine Translation of terminology in the patent text from English into Chinese”. ASP Transactions on Computers 1 (1): 12–17.
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WIPO. (2021). World Intellectual Property Indicators 2021. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
OEPM. (2021). “Entrevista al Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 71: 2–10.
Whitman, K. (2011). “Intellogist: An online community dedicated to comparing major patent search systems”. World Patent Information 33 (2): 168–179.
Wang, D. (2009). “Chinese to English automatic patent machine translation at SIPO”. World Patent Information 31 (2): 137–139.
van Dulken, S. (2014). “Do you know English? The challenge of the English language for patent searchers”. World Patent Information 39: 35–40.
Silvast, A., Laes, E., Abram, S., & Bombaerts, G. (2020). “What do energy modellers know? An ethnography of epistemic values and knowledge models”. Energy Research & Social Science 66: 101495.
Schuett, F. (2013). “Patent quality and incentives at the patent office”. The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (2): 313–336.
Sáiz, P., & Amengual, R. (2018). “Do patents enable disclosure? Strategic innovation management of the four-stroke engine”. Industrial and Corporate Change 27 (6): 975–997.
Righi, C., & Simcoe, T. (2019). “Patent examiner specialization”. Research Policy 48 (1): 137–148.
Ohms, J. (2021). “Current methodologies for chemical compound searching in patents: A case study”. World Patent Information 66: 102055.
Constitución Española (1978, Diciembre 29). Boletín Oficial del Estado. Diekmann, S., & Peterson, M. (2013). “The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models”. Science and Engineering Ethics 19: 207–218.
Carrara, P., & Russo, D. (2017). “Patent searches opinion: How to minimize the risk when reviewing patent applications”. World Patent Information 49: 43–51.
Publication
valores epistêmicos,
Baruffaldi, S., & Raffo, J. (2017). “The geography of duplicated inventions: evidence from patent citations”. Regional Studies 51(8): 1232–1245.
27
incentivos
bancos de dados,
contrato social,
inovação,
incentivos
Artículo de revista
bases de datos,
contrato social,
innovación,
valores epistémicos,
Acosta, Benedicto
Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de los examinadores. Este estudio se basa principalmente en doce entrevistas en profundidad con examinadores de patentes españoles. La información analizada sugiere situaciones que pueden afectar la forma en que la tesis del contrato explica: (1) la difusión de la información y (2) los valores epistémicos que conducen a la innovación tecnológica.
Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
52
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Benedicto Acosta - 2024
application/pdf
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Revista de Economía Institucional
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10062
Español
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
According to the social contract theory of patents, States grant commercial exclusivity to inventors in exchange for the disclosure of the technology, with the aim of enabling future innovations. The argument I will defend is that, under the rationale of the social contract theory, not being guided by certain epistemic values can contribute to a scenario in which disclosure of inventions does not enable technological innovation. First, I explain how the visibility and accessibility of the information disclosed can be affected by problems in databases and patent search engines. Second, I analyze how patent offices may not be encouraging searches and the training of the examiners. This study mainly relies on twelve in-depth interviews with Spanish patent examiners. The information analysed suggests situations that may affect the way in which the contract thesis explains: (1) the dissemination of information and (2) the epistemic values that lead to technological innovation.
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
Journal article
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10062/17158
https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.12
10.18601/01245996.v27n52.12
2346-2450
0124-5996
2024-12-04
341
2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
356
2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Revista de Economía Institucional
title Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
spellingShingle Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
Acosta, Benedicto
valores epistêmicos,
incentivos
bancos de dados,
contrato social,
inovação,
incentivos
bases de datos,
contrato social,
innovación,
valores epistémicos,
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
title_short Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_full Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_fullStr Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_full_unstemmed Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
title_sort values matter: patent office, innovation and the social contract
title_eng Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract
description Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de los examinadores. Este estudio se basa principalmente en doce entrevistas en profundidad con examinadores de patentes españoles. La información analizada sugiere situaciones que pueden afectar la forma en que la tesis del contrato explica: (1) la difusión de la información y (2) los valores epistémicos que conducen a la innovación tecnológica.
description_eng According to the social contract theory of patents, States grant commercial exclusivity to inventors in exchange for the disclosure of the technology, with the aim of enabling future innovations. The argument I will defend is that, under the rationale of the social contract theory, not being guided by certain epistemic values can contribute to a scenario in which disclosure of inventions does not enable technological innovation. First, I explain how the visibility and accessibility of the information disclosed can be affected by problems in databases and patent search engines. Second, I analyze how patent offices may not be encouraging searches and the training of the examiners. This study mainly relies on twelve in-depth interviews with Spanish patent examiners. The information analysed suggests situations that may affect the way in which the contract thesis explains: (1) the dissemination of information and (2) the epistemic values that lead to technological innovation.
author Acosta, Benedicto
author_facet Acosta, Benedicto
topicspa_str_mv valores epistêmicos,
incentivos
bancos de dados,
contrato social,
inovação,
incentivos
bases de datos,
contrato social,
innovación,
valores epistémicos,
topic valores epistêmicos,
incentivos
bancos de dados,
contrato social,
inovação,
incentivos
bases de datos,
contrato social,
innovación,
valores epistémicos,
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
topic_facet valores epistêmicos,
incentivos
bancos de dados,
contrato social,
inovação,
incentivos
bases de datos,
contrato social,
innovación,
valores epistémicos,
Epistemic values,
innovation,
social contract,
databases,
incentives
citationvolume 27
citationissue 52
citationedition Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
publisher Universidad Externado de Colombia
ispartofjournal Revista de Economía Institucional
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10062
language Español
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Benedicto Acosta - 2024
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
references Langinier, C., & Marcoul, P. (2020). “Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners”. Journal of Economics and Business 110: 105906.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). “An Economic Theory of Technological Change”. The American Economic Review 59 (2): 18–28.
Nelson, R. R. (1989). “What Is Private and What Is Public About Technology?” Science, Technology, & Human Values 14 (3): 229–241.
Nagar, V., Schoenfeld, J., & Wellman, L. (2019). “The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 67 (1): 36–57.
McMullin, E. (1982). “Values in Science”. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2): 3–28.
Lemley, M. A., & Sampat, B. (2012). “Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3): 817–827.
Larroyed, A. A. (2019). Translation accuracy and dissemination of disclosure of patent information: an analysis of translation and its influence on patent law. Proefschrift Maken Maastricht.
Larroyed, A. A. (2018). “Machine Translation and Disclosure of Patent Information”. IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 49 (7): 763–786.
Kuhn, J. M. (2011). “Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem”. Yale Journal of Law and Technology 90: 89–140.
OEPM. (2013). Memoria de Actividades. Available at http://www.oepm.gob.es/export/sites/oepm/comun/documentos_relacionados/Memorias_de_Actividades_y_Estadisticas/Memorias_de_actividades/Memoria_de_Actividades_2013_ES.pdf
Huby, R., & Schenk, V. T. (1994). “Some problems in the translation of Japanese patents”. World Patent Information 16 (3): 154–158.
Hegde, D., & Raj, M. (2019). “Does Gender Affect Work? Evidence from U.S. Patent Examination”. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339555
Griliches, Z. (1990). “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal of Economic Literature 28(4): 1661–1707.
Gallini, N., & Scotchmer, S. (2002). “Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 2: 51–77.
European Patent Office. (2012). Patent teaching kit – Protect your ideas. Munich. Retrieved from https://e-courses.epo.org/pluginfile.php/1428/mod_resource/content/1/data/cm1.pdf
Eisenberg, R. (1989). “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use”. University of Chicago Law Review 56 (3): 1017–1086.
Eckert, A., & Langinier, C. (2014). “A Survey of the Economics of Patent Systems and Procedures”. Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (5): 996–1015.
Drahos, P. (2010). The Global Governance of Knowledge. Patent Offices and their Clients. Cambridge University Press.
OECD. (2005). Oslo Manual. OECD-EUROSTAT.
OEPM. (2018). “Entrevista a José Antonio Gil Celedonio, nuevo Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 62: 4–12.
Chang, H. F. (1995). “Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation”. RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1): 34–57.
Ying, C., Shuyu, Y., Jing, L., Lin, D., & Qi, Q. (2021). “Errors of Machine Translation of terminology in the patent text from English into Chinese”. ASP Transactions on Computers 1 (1): 12–17.
WIPO. (2021). World Intellectual Property Indicators 2021. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
OEPM. (2021). “Entrevista al Director de la OEPM”. Marchamos. Revista de Comunicación Interna de La OEPM 71: 2–10.
Whitman, K. (2011). “Intellogist: An online community dedicated to comparing major patent search systems”. World Patent Information 33 (2): 168–179.
Wang, D. (2009). “Chinese to English automatic patent machine translation at SIPO”. World Patent Information 31 (2): 137–139.
van Dulken, S. (2014). “Do you know English? The challenge of the English language for patent searchers”. World Patent Information 39: 35–40.
Silvast, A., Laes, E., Abram, S., & Bombaerts, G. (2020). “What do energy modellers know? An ethnography of epistemic values and knowledge models”. Energy Research & Social Science 66: 101495.
Schuett, F. (2013). “Patent quality and incentives at the patent office”. The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (2): 313–336.
Sáiz, P., & Amengual, R. (2018). “Do patents enable disclosure? Strategic innovation management of the four-stroke engine”. Industrial and Corporate Change 27 (6): 975–997.
Righi, C., & Simcoe, T. (2019). “Patent examiner specialization”. Research Policy 48 (1): 137–148.
Ohms, J. (2021). “Current methodologies for chemical compound searching in patents: A case study”. World Patent Information 66: 102055.
Constitución Española (1978, Diciembre 29). Boletín Oficial del Estado. Diekmann, S., & Peterson, M. (2013). “The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models”. Science and Engineering Ethics 19: 207–218.
Carrara, P., & Russo, D. (2017). “Patent searches opinion: How to minimize the risk when reviewing patent applications”. World Patent Information 49: 43–51.
Baruffaldi, S., & Raffo, J. (2017). “The geography of duplicated inventions: evidence from patent citations”. Regional Studies 51(8): 1232–1245.
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