Subastas: diseño y estrategia
Titulo:

Subastas: diseño y estrategia
.

Sumario:

Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente,... Ver más

Guardado en:

Revista de Economía Institucional

0124-5996

2346-2450

Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07

27

2024-12-04

191

216

Colombia

Leilões,

Custos de mudança,

Regulação e política industrial,

Investimentos em relações específicas,

Contratos,

Design de mecanismos,

Lock-in

costos de cambio,

regulación y política industrial,

Inversiones de relación específica,

contratos,

diseño de mecanismos,

Subastas,

Lock-in

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spelling Subastas: diseño y estrategia
Ishii, R. (2009). Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), 137-144.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58-73.
Mölleryd, B. G., & Markendahl, J. (2014). Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices. Telecommunications Policy, 38(3), 236-247.
Mintic. (2013). Gobierno adjudica licencias de 4G. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/604/w3-article-2029.html
Lewis, T. R., & Yildirim, H. (2005). Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with strategic buyers. International Economic Review, 46(4), 1233-1269.
Lau, S. (2008). Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 266-282.
Klemperer, P. (2007). Bidding markets. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3(1), 1-47.
Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press.
Klemperer, P. (2002b). What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.
Klemperer, P. (2002a). How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 829-845.
Hu, L., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2014). Spectrum license auctions with exit (and call) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem. Information Economics and Policy, 27, 13-23.
Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 245-272.
Hazlett, T. W., Porter, D., & Smith, V. (2011). Radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of Ronald Coase. The Journal of Law and Economics, 54(S4), S125-S165.
Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J. J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294.
Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2004). Notes and comments the Amsterdam auction. Econometrica, 72(1), 281-294.
Froeb, L. M., Shor, M., & Tschantz, S. (2008). Mergers in auctions with an incumbent advantage. Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper, (08-24).
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1967-2072.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1983). Competitive bidding and proprietary information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11(2), 161-169.
Durá, P. (2003). Teoría de subastas y reputación del vendedor (No. CNMV Documentos de Trabajo no. 3. 2003). CNMV-Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores-Departamento de Estudios y Estadísticas.
Dequiedt, V. (2007). Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 302-323.
Dass, M., Reddy, S. K., & Iacobucci, D. (2014). Social networks among auction bidders: The role of key bidders and structural properties on auction prices. Social Networks, 37, 14-28.
Chen, J., Chen, X., Kauffman, R. J., & Song, X. (2009). Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 8(4), 191-202.
McMillan, J. (1994). Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), 145-162. Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089-1122.
Milgrom, P., & Milgrom, P. R. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press.
Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C. A., Myers, E., Palmer, K., & Shobe, W. (2009). Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(4), 672-691.
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press.
Text
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Zhou, N. (2003). Bidding between incumbent and entrant. Economics Letters, 80(3), 295-303.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). Oxford University Press.
Vasconcelos, L. (2014). Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 19-33.
Varian, H. R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics (8.ª ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.
Tsang, S., Koh, Y. S., Dobbie, G., & Alam, S. (2014). Detecting online auction shilling frauds using supervised learning. Expert Systems with Applications, 41(6), 3027-3040.
Subramani, M. R., & Venkatraman, N. (2003). Safeguarding investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships: Theory and evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1), 46-62.
Strieborny, M., & Kukenova, M. (2015). Investment in relationship-specific assets: Does finance matter?. Review of Finance, 20(4), 1487-1515.
Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2004). Hold-up and sequential specific investments. RAND Journal of Economics, 386-400.
Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(2), 177-195.
Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Financing auction bids. RAND Journal of Economics, 789-815.
Praxmarer-Carus, S. (2014). Why the proposal of a complex contract may harm or foster a partner’s trust. Journal of Business Research, 67(7), 1421-1429.
Padhi, S. S., & Mohapatra, P. K. (2011). Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17(4), 207-221.
Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1-40.
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review, 99(4), 1544-1575.
Publication
Leilões,
27
Āzacis, H., & Burguet, R. (2008). Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo–Dutch auction meets another simple alternative. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(3), 730-745.
Custos de mudança,
Regulação e política industrial,
Investimentos em relações específicas,
Contratos,
Design de mecanismos,
Lock-in
Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
costos de cambio,
regulación y política industrial,
Inversiones de relación específica,
contratos,
diseño de mecanismos,
Subastas,
Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica que identifica los desarrollos recientes y las perspectivas de investigación en el área.
52
Lock-in
Artículo de revista
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10057
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. (2007). Recent developments in the theory of regulation. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1557-1700.
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Español
Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024
Revista de Economía Institucional
Universidad Externado de Colombia
application/pdf
Switching Costs,
This paper examines elements to consider in auctions beyond the analysis of rational and strategic behavior, and the pursuit of efficiency and better prices for the auctioneer. This work analyzes aspects such as the generation of entry expectations, financing, contract design, and governance mechanisms. For procurement auctions, we analyze auction design elements aimed at attracting entrants, preventing collusion, and avoiding market concentration. It also explores conditions that may lead to ex ante and ex post market power, their impact, possible mechanisms for detection and prevention, and how these are reflected in switching costs. Finally, a bibliographic review was conducted to identify recent developments and research perspectives in this area.
Auctions,
Mechanism Design,
Contracts,
Specific Relationship Investments,
Regulation and Industrial Policy,
Lock-in
Journal article
Auctions: Design and Strategy
0124-5996
191
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/download/10057/17153
2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
2024-12-04
https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07
10.18601/01245996.v27n52.07
216
2346-2450
2024-12-04T15:17:53Z
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Revista de Economía Institucional
title Subastas: diseño y estrategia
spellingShingle Subastas: diseño y estrategia
Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
Leilões,
Custos de mudança,
Regulação e política industrial,
Investimentos em relações específicas,
Contratos,
Design de mecanismos,
Lock-in
costos de cambio,
regulación y política industrial,
Inversiones de relación específica,
contratos,
diseño de mecanismos,
Subastas,
Lock-in
Switching Costs,
Auctions,
Mechanism Design,
Contracts,
Specific Relationship Investments,
Regulation and Industrial Policy,
Lock-in
title_short Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_full Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_fullStr Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_full_unstemmed Subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_sort subastas: diseño y estrategia
title_eng Auctions: Design and Strategy
description Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica que identifica los desarrollos recientes y las perspectivas de investigación en el área.
description_eng This paper examines elements to consider in auctions beyond the analysis of rational and strategic behavior, and the pursuit of efficiency and better prices for the auctioneer. This work analyzes aspects such as the generation of entry expectations, financing, contract design, and governance mechanisms. For procurement auctions, we analyze auction design elements aimed at attracting entrants, preventing collusion, and avoiding market concentration. It also explores conditions that may lead to ex ante and ex post market power, their impact, possible mechanisms for detection and prevention, and how these are reflected in switching costs. Finally, a bibliographic review was conducted to identify recent developments and research perspectives in this area.
author Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
author_facet Aldana Jaúregui, Ana Teresa
topicspa_str_mv Leilões,
Custos de mudança,
Regulação e política industrial,
Investimentos em relações específicas,
Contratos,
Design de mecanismos,
Lock-in
costos de cambio,
regulación y política industrial,
Inversiones de relación específica,
contratos,
diseño de mecanismos,
Subastas,
Lock-in
topic Leilões,
Custos de mudança,
Regulação e política industrial,
Investimentos em relações específicas,
Contratos,
Design de mecanismos,
Lock-in
costos de cambio,
regulación y política industrial,
Inversiones de relación específica,
contratos,
diseño de mecanismos,
Subastas,
Lock-in
Switching Costs,
Auctions,
Mechanism Design,
Contracts,
Specific Relationship Investments,
Regulation and Industrial Policy,
Lock-in
topic_facet Leilões,
Custos de mudança,
Regulação e política industrial,
Investimentos em relações específicas,
Contratos,
Design de mecanismos,
Lock-in
costos de cambio,
regulación y política industrial,
Inversiones de relación específica,
contratos,
diseño de mecanismos,
Subastas,
Lock-in
Switching Costs,
Auctions,
Mechanism Design,
Contracts,
Specific Relationship Investments,
Regulation and Industrial Policy,
Lock-in
citationvolume 27
citationissue 52
citationedition Núm. 52 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
publisher Universidad Externado de Colombia
ispartofjournal Revista de Economía Institucional
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/ecoins/article/view/10057
language Español
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Ana Teresa Aldana Jaúregui - 2024
references Ishii, R. (2009). Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), 137-144.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58-73.
Mölleryd, B. G., & Markendahl, J. (2014). Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices. Telecommunications Policy, 38(3), 236-247.
Mintic. (2013). Gobierno adjudica licencias de 4G. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/604/w3-article-2029.html
Lewis, T. R., & Yildirim, H. (2005). Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with strategic buyers. International Economic Review, 46(4), 1233-1269.
Lau, S. (2008). Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 266-282.
Klemperer, P. (2007). Bidding markets. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3(1), 1-47.
Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press.
Klemperer, P. (2002b). What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.
Klemperer, P. (2002a). How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 829-845.
Hu, L., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2014). Spectrum license auctions with exit (and call) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem. Information Economics and Policy, 27, 13-23.
Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 245-272.
Hazlett, T. W., Porter, D., & Smith, V. (2011). Radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of Ronald Coase. The Journal of Law and Economics, 54(S4), S125-S165.
Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J. J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294.
Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2004). Notes and comments the Amsterdam auction. Econometrica, 72(1), 281-294.
Froeb, L. M., Shor, M., & Tschantz, S. (2008). Mergers in auctions with an incumbent advantage. Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper, (08-24).
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1967-2072.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1983). Competitive bidding and proprietary information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11(2), 161-169.
Durá, P. (2003). Teoría de subastas y reputación del vendedor (No. CNMV Documentos de Trabajo no. 3. 2003). CNMV-Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores-Departamento de Estudios y Estadísticas.
Dequiedt, V. (2007). Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 302-323.
Dass, M., Reddy, S. K., & Iacobucci, D. (2014). Social networks among auction bidders: The role of key bidders and structural properties on auction prices. Social Networks, 37, 14-28.
Chen, J., Chen, X., Kauffman, R. J., & Song, X. (2009). Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 8(4), 191-202.
McMillan, J. (1994). Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), 145-162. Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089-1122.
Milgrom, P., & Milgrom, P. R. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press.
Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C. A., Myers, E., Palmer, K., & Shobe, W. (2009). Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(4), 672-691.
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press.
Zhou, N. (2003). Bidding between incumbent and entrant. Economics Letters, 80(3), 295-303.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). Oxford University Press.
Vasconcelos, L. (2014). Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 19-33.
Varian, H. R. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics (8.ª ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.
Tsang, S., Koh, Y. S., Dobbie, G., & Alam, S. (2014). Detecting online auction shilling frauds using supervised learning. Expert Systems with Applications, 41(6), 3027-3040.
Subramani, M. R., & Venkatraman, N. (2003). Safeguarding investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships: Theory and evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 46(1), 46-62.
Strieborny, M., & Kukenova, M. (2015). Investment in relationship-specific assets: Does finance matter?. Review of Finance, 20(4), 1487-1515.
Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2004). Hold-up and sequential specific investments. RAND Journal of Economics, 386-400.
Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(2), 177-195.
Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Financing auction bids. RAND Journal of Economics, 789-815.
Praxmarer-Carus, S. (2014). Why the proposal of a complex contract may harm or foster a partner’s trust. Journal of Business Research, 67(7), 1421-1429.
Padhi, S. S., & Mohapatra, P. K. (2011). Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 17(4), 207-221.
Coase, R. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1-40.
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review, 99(4), 1544-1575.
Āzacis, H., & Burguet, R. (2008). Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo–Dutch auction meets another simple alternative. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(3), 730-745.
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. (2007). Recent developments in the theory of regulation. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 3, 1557-1700.
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