South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
Titulo:

South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
.

Sumario:

La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to e... Ver más

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1657-7558

2346-2132

Silveira Nummer, Martha

Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça

Silva Viana , Thaisa da

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/16577558.n41.04

2024-12-03

43

67

Colombia

percepciones de líderes

realismo neoclásico;

hedging;

Corea del Sur;

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Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024

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spelling South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019). Diplomatic White Paper 2019. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
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Moon, J. (2017b). 제19대 대통령 취임식. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (상 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401691
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Diplomatic White Paper 2012. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). Diplomatic White Paper 2008. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Minister of Unification (2017). Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula: Three goals. https://web.archive.org/web/20200522081715/https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/goals/
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Medeiros, E. S. (2005). Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability. Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 145-167.
Marston, H. S. (2024). Navigating great power competition: A neoclassical realist view of hedging. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 24(1), 29-63.
Lee, Y. (2021). Riding the tide: Assessing South Korea’s hedging strategy through regional security initiatives. The Pacific Review, 36(3), 494-520. Maduz, L. (2023). Explaining Korea’s positioning in the US–China strategic competition. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), China-US competition (pp. 247-273). Springer International Publishing.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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Núm. 41 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
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https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/10021
Oasis
Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales
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percepciones de líderes
realismo neoclásico;
hedging;
Corea del Sur;
Silveira Nummer, Martha
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silva Viana , Thaisa da
La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to estratégico de Corea del Sur (hedging, balancing o bandwagoning). Evaluamos el comportamiento de Corea del Sur utili­zando un análisis realista neoclásico de las percepciones de sus líderes respecto a Corea del Norte, Estados Unidos y China. Las variables independientes incluyen la distri­bución de poder en el sistema internacional, el contexto regional, la interdependencia económica y la red de alianzas de Estados Unidos. Nuestras variables intervinientes son las percepciones de los líderes, especí­ficamente sus evaluaciones de riesgo, y las imágenes que guían sus decisiones de hed­ging, balancing o bandwagoning con China y Estados Unidos. La investigación se llevó a cabo a través de un análisis bibliográfico y un examen de documentos oficiales, inclui­dos libros blancos, informes de defensa y discursos oficiales. Un hallazgo clave es que comprender el comportamiento de seguri­dad de Seúl requiere un examen cuidadoso de las acciones de Corea del Norte. Además, la decisión de hacer hedging o balancing no está impulsada por factores ideológicos; más bien, proviene de la percepción de cuál de los dos –China o Estados Unidos– apoya mejor las estrategias políticas de Seúl y sus relaciones esperadas con Pyongyang.
Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024
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Kim, H. (2022). South Korea’s response to the BRI: Hedging amidst change and continuity in the international system. In The belt and road initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Routledge.
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Choo, J. (2019). Conservative and progressive stances on China and their impact on South Korea-China relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 88-105). Routledge.
Kim, L. (2018). South Korea’s nuclear hedging? The Washington Quarterly, 41(1), 115-133.
Chae, H., & Kim, S. (2008). Conservatives and progressives in South Korea. The Washington Quarterly, 31(4), 77-95.
Kim, Y. S. (2008). Lee proposes shuttle diplomacy with N. Korea. Korea Times. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/05/103_20547.html
Cha, V. D. (2009). Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. alliance system in Asia. International Security, 34(3), 158-196.
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neoclassical realism;
The geostrategic competition between the U.S.-led security network in the Indo- Pacific and China is intensifying. Amid this hegemonic rivalry between the US and China, South Korea emerges as an actor grappling with finding its position between Washington and Beijing. Despite its formal strategic partnership with the United States, much of the academic literature argues that Seoul has displayed behavior resem­bling hedging over the years. This article demonstrates that South Korea’s strategic behavior—whether hedging, balancing, or bandwagoning—is shaped by the strategic environment, varying levels of threat per­ception, and the political orientations of its leaders concerning North Korea. Using a neoclassical realist framework, we assess South Korea’s actions through an analysis of its leaders’ perceptions of North Korea, the U.S., and China. The independent vari­ables include the distribution of power in the international system, the regional con­text, economic interdependence, and the U.S. network of alliances. The interven­ing variables are the leaders’ perceptions, particularly their risk assessments and the images guiding their decisions to hedge, balance, or bandwagoning with China and the United States. The research is based on a bibliographic analysis and a review of official documents, including White Papers, defense reports, and official speeches. A key finding is that understanding Seoul’s secu­rity behavior requires careful consideration of North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, the decision to hedge or balance is driven not by ideology but by perceptions of which actor better supports Seoul’s political goals and relations with Pyongyang.
South Korea;
Journal article
hedging;
South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
leaders’ perceptions
67
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/download/10021/17121
43
2024-12-03T10:38:49Z
2024-12-03T10:38:49Z
2024-12-03
1657-7558
2346-2132
https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n41.04
10.18601/16577558.n41.04
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Oasis
title South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
spellingShingle South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
Silveira Nummer, Martha
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silva Viana , Thaisa da
percepciones de líderes
realismo neoclásico;
hedging;
Corea del Sur;
neoclassical realism;
South Korea;
hedging;
leaders’ perceptions
title_short South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_full South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_fullStr South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_full_unstemmed South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_sort south korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: assessing china, the us and north korea’s role
title_eng South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
description La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to estratégico de Corea del Sur (hedging, balancing o bandwagoning). Evaluamos el comportamiento de Corea del Sur utili­zando un análisis realista neoclásico de las percepciones de sus líderes respecto a Corea del Norte, Estados Unidos y China. Las variables independientes incluyen la distri­bución de poder en el sistema internacional, el contexto regional, la interdependencia económica y la red de alianzas de Estados Unidos. Nuestras variables intervinientes son las percepciones de los líderes, especí­ficamente sus evaluaciones de riesgo, y las imágenes que guían sus decisiones de hed­ging, balancing o bandwagoning con China y Estados Unidos. La investigación se llevó a cabo a través de un análisis bibliográfico y un examen de documentos oficiales, inclui­dos libros blancos, informes de defensa y discursos oficiales. Un hallazgo clave es que comprender el comportamiento de seguri­dad de Seúl requiere un examen cuidadoso de las acciones de Corea del Norte. Además, la decisión de hacer hedging o balancing no está impulsada por factores ideológicos; más bien, proviene de la percepción de cuál de los dos –China o Estados Unidos– apoya mejor las estrategias políticas de Seúl y sus relaciones esperadas con Pyongyang.
description_eng The geostrategic competition between the U.S.-led security network in the Indo- Pacific and China is intensifying. Amid this hegemonic rivalry between the US and China, South Korea emerges as an actor grappling with finding its position between Washington and Beijing. Despite its formal strategic partnership with the United States, much of the academic literature argues that Seoul has displayed behavior resem­bling hedging over the years. This article demonstrates that South Korea’s strategic behavior—whether hedging, balancing, or bandwagoning—is shaped by the strategic environment, varying levels of threat per­ception, and the political orientations of its leaders concerning North Korea. Using a neoclassical realist framework, we assess South Korea’s actions through an analysis of its leaders’ perceptions of North Korea, the U.S., and China. The independent vari­ables include the distribution of power in the international system, the regional con­text, economic interdependence, and the U.S. network of alliances. The interven­ing variables are the leaders’ perceptions, particularly their risk assessments and the images guiding their decisions to hedge, balance, or bandwagoning with China and the United States. The research is based on a bibliographic analysis and a review of official documents, including White Papers, defense reports, and official speeches. A key finding is that understanding Seoul’s secu­rity behavior requires careful consideration of North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, the decision to hedge or balance is driven not by ideology but by perceptions of which actor better supports Seoul’s political goals and relations with Pyongyang.
author Silveira Nummer, Martha
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silva Viana , Thaisa da
author_facet Silveira Nummer, Martha
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silva Viana , Thaisa da
topicspa_str_mv percepciones de líderes
realismo neoclásico;
hedging;
Corea del Sur;
topic percepciones de líderes
realismo neoclásico;
hedging;
Corea del Sur;
neoclassical realism;
South Korea;
hedging;
leaders’ perceptions
topic_facet percepciones de líderes
realismo neoclásico;
hedging;
Corea del Sur;
neoclassical realism;
South Korea;
hedging;
leaders’ perceptions
citationissue 41
citationedition Núm. 41 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
publisher Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales
ispartofjournal Oasis
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/10021
language Español
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020). Diplomatic White Paper 2020. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). Diplomatic White Paper 2018. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Moon, J. (2017b). 제19대 대통령 취임식. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (상 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401691
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Diplomatic White Paper 2012. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
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Minister of Unification (2017). Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula: Three goals. https://web.archive.org/web/20200522081715/https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/goals/
Milani, M. (2019). Progressive and conservative visions of inter-Korean relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 54-68). Routledge.
Medeiros, E. S. (2005). Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability. Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 145-167.
Marston, H. S. (2024). Navigating great power competition: A neoclassical realist view of hedging. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 24(1), 29-63.
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