Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
Titulo:

Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
.

Sumario:

La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.

Guardado en:

Con-texto

0123-6458

2346-2078

Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis

Garay Forero, Juan Carlos

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/01236458.n50.04

2019-08-12

37

64

Colombia

Reglas de planeación económica;

Largo plazo

Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

id metarevistapublica_uexternado_con_texto_3_article_6133
record_format ojs
spelling Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
The Colombian National Development Plan and the Long Term
La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 implemented planning tools to achieve economic development in the long term. However it stablished as a development strategy the implementation of a National Development Plan for every 4 year goverment period. This essay explains what legally must be interpreted for “long term” in a context where regulatory tools are seen as relevant to achieve development goals.
Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis
Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
Economic Planning Rules;
Long Term
Reglas de planeación económica;
Largo plazo
50
Núm. 50 , Año 2018 : Julio-Diciembre
Artículo de revista
Journal article
2019-08-12T08:52:45Z
2019-08-12T08:52:45Z
2019-08-12
application/pdf
Departamento de Derecho Económico
Con-texto
0123-6458
2346-2078
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/6133
10.18601/01236458.n50.04
https://doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n50.04
spa
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019
37
64
Adelman, J. (2013). Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press.
Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.” The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 211-221.
Boyck o Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1996) “A Theory of Privatization.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435 (Mar)
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The nature of the firm.”Economica 4, n.° 16 (1937): 386-405.
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The Problem of social cost” Journal of law & economics. 3 (1960): 1.
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “Accounting and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990): 3-13.
Cox Gary “The Efficient Secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England.” Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Gary. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures”, en The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, editado por Barry Weingast y Donald Wittman (2006) Oxford University Press.
Dell, Melissa. (2010). “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6), 1.863-1.903.
Downs, Anthony. “An economic theory of political action in a democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy (1957): 135-150.
Evans, P. & Bellamy, S. (1995). “Performance evaluation in the Australian public sector: The role of management and cost accounting control systems.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8(6).
Fogel, Robert W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” The American Economic Review, 84(3), 369-395.
Guinand, L. M. (2014). The changing role of the central planning offices Latin America: a comparative historical analysis perspective (1950-2013). Maastricht University.
Hardin, Garr ett . “The tragedy of the commons.” Science 162, n.° 3859 (1968): 1.243-1.248.
Hayek, Friedrich August. “The use of knowledge in society.” The American economic review (1945): 519-530.
Hayek, Friedrich August. Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge, 2012.
Keynes, John Maynard (1971) Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol 4. (A tract on Monetary Reform). Macmillian.
Kornai, Janos (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30.
Kornai, J.; Maskin, E. & Roland, G. (2003). “Understanding the soft budget constraint.” Journal of economic literature, 1095-1136.
Majone, G. (1997). “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance.” Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167.
McCubbins, Mathew. “Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle”, en Handbook of New Institutional Economics, editado por Claude Ménard y Mary Shirley (2008) Editorial Srpinger.
McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic theory 12, n.° 3 (1976): 472-482.
Meng, Xin; Nancy Qian and Pierre Yared. The institutional causes of China’s great famine, 1959-61. n.° w16361. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
Nort h, Douglass C. “Institutions and credible commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (jite)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): 11-23.
Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantc hekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3221-52.
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Premchand, A. (1995). Effective government accounting. International Monetary Fund.
Riker, William H. and Steven J. Brams. “The paradox of vote trading.” The American Political Science Review (1973): 1.235-1.247.
Samuel, S.; Covaleski, M. A. & Dirsmith, M. W. (2008). “Accounting in and for us Governments and Non-profit Organizations: a Review of Research and a Call to Further Inquiry.” Handbooks of Management Accounting Research, 3, 1.299-1.322.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public choice 37, n.° 3 (1981): 503-519.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Political Science (1984): 49-74.
Tataru, Maria, and Vincent Merlin. “On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34, n.° 1 (1997): 81-90.
Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis (2007). Presupuesto. Una aproximación desde la Planeación y el Gasto Público, Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
Weingast, Barr y R. and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” The Journal of Political Economy (1988): 132-163.
Williamson, Oliver E. “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.” Journal of law and economics (1979): 233-261.
Young, Peyton. “Optimal Voting Rules.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, n.º 1 (1995): 51-64.
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/download/6133/7893
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Text
Publication
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Con-texto
title Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
spellingShingle Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis
Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
Economic Planning Rules;
Long Term
Reglas de planeación económica;
Largo plazo
title_short Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_full Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_fullStr Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_full_unstemmed Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_sort largo plazo y plan nacional de desarrollo
title_eng The Colombian National Development Plan and the Long Term
description La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.
description_eng The Colombian Constitution of 1991 implemented planning tools to achieve economic development in the long term. However it stablished as a development strategy the implementation of a National Development Plan for every 4 year goverment period. This essay explains what legally must be interpreted for “long term” in a context where regulatory tools are seen as relevant to achieve development goals.
author Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis
Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
author_facet Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis
Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
topic Economic Planning Rules;
Long Term
Reglas de planeación económica;
Largo plazo
topic_facet Economic Planning Rules;
Long Term
Reglas de planeación económica;
Largo plazo
topicspa_str_mv Reglas de planeación económica;
Largo plazo
citationissue 50
citationedition Núm. 50 , Año 2018 : Julio-Diciembre
publisher Departamento de Derecho Económico
ispartofjournal Con-texto
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/6133
language spa
format Article
rights https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
references Adelman, J. (2013). Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press.
Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.” The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 211-221.
Boyck o Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1996) “A Theory of Privatization.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435 (Mar)
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The nature of the firm.”Economica 4, n.° 16 (1937): 386-405.
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The Problem of social cost” Journal of law & economics. 3 (1960): 1.
Coase, Ronald Harr y. “Accounting and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990): 3-13.
Cox Gary “The Efficient Secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England.” Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Gary. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures”, en The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, editado por Barry Weingast y Donald Wittman (2006) Oxford University Press.
Dell, Melissa. (2010). “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6), 1.863-1.903.
Downs, Anthony. “An economic theory of political action in a democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy (1957): 135-150.
Evans, P. & Bellamy, S. (1995). “Performance evaluation in the Australian public sector: The role of management and cost accounting control systems.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8(6).
Fogel, Robert W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” The American Economic Review, 84(3), 369-395.
Guinand, L. M. (2014). The changing role of the central planning offices Latin America: a comparative historical analysis perspective (1950-2013). Maastricht University.
Hardin, Garr ett . “The tragedy of the commons.” Science 162, n.° 3859 (1968): 1.243-1.248.
Hayek, Friedrich August. “The use of knowledge in society.” The American economic review (1945): 519-530.
Hayek, Friedrich August. Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge, 2012.
Keynes, John Maynard (1971) Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol 4. (A tract on Monetary Reform). Macmillian.
Kornai, Janos (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30.
Kornai, J.; Maskin, E. & Roland, G. (2003). “Understanding the soft budget constraint.” Journal of economic literature, 1095-1136.
Majone, G. (1997). “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance.” Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167.
McCubbins, Mathew. “Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle”, en Handbook of New Institutional Economics, editado por Claude Ménard y Mary Shirley (2008) Editorial Srpinger.
McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic theory 12, n.° 3 (1976): 472-482.
Meng, Xin; Nancy Qian and Pierre Yared. The institutional causes of China’s great famine, 1959-61. n.° w16361. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
Nort h, Douglass C. “Institutions and credible commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (jite)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): 11-23.
Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantc hekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3221-52.
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Premchand, A. (1995). Effective government accounting. International Monetary Fund.
Riker, William H. and Steven J. Brams. “The paradox of vote trading.” The American Political Science Review (1973): 1.235-1.247.
Samuel, S.; Covaleski, M. A. & Dirsmith, M. W. (2008). “Accounting in and for us Governments and Non-profit Organizations: a Review of Research and a Call to Further Inquiry.” Handbooks of Management Accounting Research, 3, 1.299-1.322.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public choice 37, n.° 3 (1981): 503-519.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Political Science (1984): 49-74.
Tataru, Maria, and Vincent Merlin. “On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34, n.° 1 (1997): 81-90.
Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis (2007). Presupuesto. Una aproximación desde la Planeación y el Gasto Público, Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
Weingast, Barr y R. and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” The Journal of Political Economy (1988): 132-163.
Williamson, Oliver E. “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.” Journal of law and economics (1979): 233-261.
Young, Peyton. “Optimal Voting Rules.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, n.º 1 (1995): 51-64.
type_driver info:eu-repo/semantics/article
type_coar http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
type_version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
type_coarversion http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
type_content Text
publishDate 2019-08-12
date_accessioned 2019-08-12T08:52:45Z
date_available 2019-08-12T08:52:45Z
url https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/6133
url_doi https://doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n50.04
issn 0123-6458
eissn 2346-2078
doi 10.18601/01236458.n50.04
citationstartpage 37
citationendpage 64
url2_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/download/6133/7893
_version_ 1811199414205677568

Código QR

Estadísticas y Métricas Alternativas

Títulos similares